Structured in an essayistic manner, the work examines the debate instituted in Critical Theory around the methodology of social sciences and the tension between traditional Theory and the proposal of Critical Theory. It proposes to compare the particularities of this debate in the work of Max Horkheimer and Jürgen Habermas, establishing their tangencies and convergences, mainly in the discourse on the role of the emancipatory structuring of critical theory in the methodology of social sciences. Emphasizing how in the work of (...) both authors, the methodological guidance of critical theory promotes the emphasis on elucidating the truth in the process of political emancipation and social awareness that makes individuals and society approach freedom. (shrink)

En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of (...) first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

Giubiliniet aloffer some helpful reflections on the conscientious provision of medical care and whether and in what circumstances professional associations ought to support the conscientious provision of abortion in circumstances where abortion is banned or heavily restricted. I have several reservations, however, about the argument developed in the article. First, the essay makes questionable use of the case of Savita Halappanavar to justify its central argument about conscientious provision. Second, there is an apparent inconsistency between this article and the authors’ (...) statements elsewhere about the conscientious refusal of care. Third, there are risks that attend to professional associations supporting practitioners who break the law, and yet Giubiliniet aldo not give sufficient attention to this. This response will briefly discuss these three concerns. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage confronte les pensées de Frege à Husserl à propos du psychologisme et pose la question de savoir comment ces deux penseurs ont pu à la fois lutter contre l'influence grandissante de ce courant et parvenir à une telle incompréhension mutuelle. L'auteur cherche à montrer comment la différence de perspective sur les sciences mathématiques les a conduit à s'opposer sur le statut de la logique et de son rapport à la pensée. S'ils s'accordent pour reconnaître que l'arithmétique implique le (...) recours à la pensée, l'un parvient à une logique symbolique, et l'autre à une logique transcendantale, deux perspectives qui supposent des idées très différentes de ce que signifie " penser ". Quels rapports la pensée entretient-elle avec la représentation et avec les symboles? L'esprit qui pense, aussi bien dans les mathématiques que dans la logique, n'est - il qu'un simple " automate " qui développe les conséquences de la vérité ou est-il responsable des lois qu'il découvre? Par-delà l'étude des divergences sur le statut de la logique, de la psychologie et de leur rapport aux mathématiques, il s'agit d'explorer une divergence plus profonde sur le rapport de la pensée à la nécessité et à la liberté. (shrink)

Many if not most sperm donors in the early years of IVF donated under conditions of anonymity. There is, however, a growing awareness of the ethical cost of withholding identifying parental information from donor children. Today, anonymous donation is illegal in many jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have gone as far as retrospectively invalidating contracts whereby donors were guaranteed anonymity. This article provides a critical evaluation of the ethics and legality of anonymous donation. We defend Australian and British legislation that has (...) outlawed donor anonymity, and we argue for the establishment of a central registry that provides donor children with the ability to easily and reliably access identifying information about their donor parents. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness are based on widely different concepts of its nature, most or all of which probably embody aspects of the truth about it. Starting with a concept of consciousness indicated by the phrase “the feeling of what happens” (the title of a book by Antonio Damásio), we attempt to build a framework capable of supporting and resolving divergent views. We picture consciousness in terms of Reality experiencing itself from the perspective of cognitive agents. Each conscious experience is (...) regarded as composed of momentary feeling events that are combined by recognition and evaluation into extended conscious episodes that bind cognitive contents with a wide range of apparent durations (0.1 secs to 2 or more secs, for us humans, depending on circumstances and context). Three necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness are identified: a) a ground of Reality, envisaged as an universal field of potentiality encompassing all possible manifestations, whether material or 'mental'; b) a transitional zone, leading to; c) a manifest world with its fundamental divisions into material, 'informational' and quale-endowed aspects. We explore ideas about the nature of these necessary conditions, how they may relate to one another and whether our suggestions have empirical implications. (shrink)

Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This volume shows: how and (...) why all of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this volume. (shrink)

This essay is a defense of the social construction of racialism. I follow a standard definition of “racialism” which is the belief that “there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, that allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with other members of any other race”. In particular I want to (...) defend the “radical” social-constructive thesis that holds “the concept of race is exclusively the product of historical and cultural causes. It claims that humans do not tend to classify people into races when groups with different phenotypes meet, save for particular historical circumstances”. The quoted position is the consensus view among historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists who study racialism but has recently been criticized by philosophical defenders of cognitive/evolutionary psychological approaches to racialism. Drawing on developmental studies as well as historical and contemporary cross-cultural research, CEP philosophers point to similarities of racialism across time and space. They hold that social constructionist approaches to racialism cannot explain these similarities. I hold that SC approaches do explain these similarities and that such similarities actually pose a significant challenge to the proposed CEP research program on racialism. (shrink)

**" CHAPTER * HUMAN NATURE In May, at the time when the French Civil Code was being drafted, one of the orators of the Tribunat, in seeking to justify the ...

En un diálogo continuo con la tradición filosófica, Zubiri va página a página describiendo el acto de la intelección humana y desmontando el cúmulo de hipótesis y teorías que subyacen al llamado «problema del conocimiento». Zubiri consigue descubrir, mediante el recurso a un procedimiento puramente descriptivo, en qué consiste el acto humano por excelencia, la intelección. La intelección humana, dice Zubiri, no es una síntesis trascendental, sino algo más simple a la vez que más radical, la mera actualización de lo (...) real en la inteligencia sentiente. (shrink)

I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...) consequentialism is true. This kind of applied moral skepticism introduces problematic limits on our ability to use objective act consequentialism’s explanatory power as evidence for its truth. This is, in part, a product of higher-order defeat as I explain in the final section. There is, however, a silver lining for objective act consequentialists. For there is at least one type of objective act consequentialism, prior existence consequentialism, that is poised to avoid at least some of the epistemic problems discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Charles Griswold has written a comprehensive philosophical study of Smith's moral and political thought. Griswold sets Smith's work in the context of the Enlightenment and relates it to current discussions in moral and political philosophy. Smith's appropriation as well as criticism of ancient philosophy, and his carefully balanced defence of a liberal and humane moral and political outlook, are also explored. This 1999 book is a major philosophical and historical reassessment of a key figure in the Enlightenment that will be (...) of particular interest to philosophers and political and legal theorists, as well as historians of ideas, rhetoric, and political economy. (shrink)

Interpreting Figurative Meaning critically evaluates the recent empirical work from psycholinguistics and neuroscience examining the successes and difficulties associated with interpreting figurative language. There is now a huge, often contradictory literature on how people understand figures of speech. Gibbs and Colston argue that there may not be a single theory or model that adequately explains both the processes and products of figurative meaning experience. Experimental research may ultimately be unable to simply adjudicate between current models in psychology, linguistics and philosophy (...) of how figurative meaning is interpreted. Alternatively, the authors advance a broad theoretical framework, motivated by ideas from 'dynamical systems theory', that describes the multiple, interacting influences which shape people's experiences of figurative meaning in discourse. This book details past research and theory, offers a critical assessment of this work and sets the stage for a new vision of figurative experience in human life. (shrink)

In earlier work, the author has studied the economic role of planning horizons in making a case for complementarity as the predominant feature of social interdependence. This paper compares the different choice strategies implied by substitution, opposition and conflicts of interest in an economics of fear with those arising from horizon effects, economic complementarity and concerts of interest in an economics based on love. The contrasting implications of a psychological literature on negative vs. positive emotions and their health effects, along (...) with the findings in neurophysiological research about how humans are hard-wired for empathy and compassion leads to some fundamental changes in how we might address and revise social problems through economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to extend a horizonal case for complementarity in the author's previous work into its psychological links to research findings on healthy cognitive function and its emotional basis. An economics of substitution yields quite different conclusions about optimal institutional forms and how we address and frame social relations than are implied by an explicitly horizonal economics of complementary social relations. Recent psychological and neurophysiological studies support a horizonal case for complementarity in social relations, showing that our orthodox substitution assumptions and models of competitive equilibrium should be rejected for a renewed economic analysis based on horizonal models of complementarity and cooperation as a means to achieve greater social well-being in a healthier and more integrative form of social organization. The issues to be explored are not entertained within the currently existing frame of orthodox economics, so we must step beyond our standard habitual assumptions. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

As a result of innovations, mainly new products and services, but also processes or new marketing methods, animal populations and species disappear. The massive development of technologies, products and consumer goods, both current and in the past, has a direct impact on the depletion of natural resources. Innovation is a dual‐entry device that can be called world‐innovation, on the one hand, and consequential‐innovation, on the other. In this chapter, the authors propose to review the change from a new perspective, more (...) precisely, with two major dimensions: world‐innovation and consequential innovation, which help us to understand why innovation has become what it is. Faced with the challenges of innovation in all the aspects we have been able to describe, we must now try to find answers and, it seems to us that this can only be done with philosophy. (shrink)

This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought. Given its thematic scope, this (...) book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions. (shrink)

F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854), le plus precoce de philosophes puis l'un des plus ages, a pati, de son vivant comme apres sa mort, de la proximite de Fichte et surtout de Hegel qui l'a supplante dans le jugement de la posterite. Mais il est en passe de combler son retard grace en particulier a l'impulsion donnee depuis un demi-siecle aux recherches sur l'idealisme allemand. Le premier volume de cet ouvrage se propose de presenter le devenir de Schelling sous le signe du (...) systeme vivant. La derniere philosophie de Schelling est analysee dans le second tome. Elle est presque tout entiere posthume, a l'exception de la Preface a Cousin (1834) et de quelques autres textes brefs. La dualite philosophique, enseignee a Berlin, est l'ultime avatar de ce qui etait de facon latente une philosophie en deux. L'auteur s'attache ici a expliquer en detail les motifs et les problemes de cette dichotomie tardive, mais fondee. (shrink)

No Tratado político, Espinosa, ao primeiro movimento do texto, faz dura crítica àqueles que criaram utopias ao tratarem da política. Tais filósofos, afirma, por tomarem os homens não pelo que são, mas pelo que gostariam que fossem, conceberam uma forma de política que nunca pôde ser posta em aplicação. Tese muito próxima à de Maquiavel, presente em O Príncipe, segundo a qual, para escrever coisa útil neste campo, deve-se ir direto alla verità effettuale della cosa che alla immaginazione di essa. (...) Não casualmente, portanto, no Capítulo V do Tratado político, último parágrafo, Espinosa usa os termos ‘agudíssimo’ e ‘prudentíssimo’ ao se referir ao florentino. Há mais Maquiavel em Espinosa para além das citações elogiosas? O artigo procurará tratar desta questão ao mostrar alguns traços comuns às respectivas filosofias políticas. Ao que indicam as fontes primárias e alguns comentadores, Espinosa teria se apropriado, e reconceitualizado, à sua maneira, teses-chave do florentino para escrever suas obras, em particular o Tratado político. (shrink)

No primeiro movimento o artigo analisa, em panorama, a ontologia espinosana. Após, mostra como, do interior dos conceitos presentes na ontologia, derivam os de homem, desejo, alegria e tristeza, esperança e medo, segurança e desespero, ação e paixão. Da relação entre ontologia, homens e desejo – bem como dos demais afetos –, são extraídas, em breves considerações, algumas teses políticas de Espinosa. Levanta-se, neste movimento argumentativo, a hipótese de que as teses políticas espinosanas derivam de sua ontologia e de sua (...) concepção de homem como desejo e variação de potência. O conceito de desejo é analisado à luz da variação de potência e do tema do direito natural, o qual, em Espinosa, se identifica a potência. Quando das breves derivações à política, algumas teses hobbesianas – relacionadas aos temas da multidão, povo, representação, direito natural, estado civil, etc. – são trazidas à argumentação para que se mostre, por contraste, o peso das inovações espinosanas. (shrink)

Este artigo investe na ideia de que a infância é um dispositivo histórico do poder. Tem-se como referência analítica Michel Foucault, que concebe a noção de dispositivo em suas discussões a respeito da sexualidade. A hipótese geradora é a de que, a partir do momento em que a criança se torna um dos grupos estratégicos do dispositivo da sexualidade, produz-se sobre ela um conjunto heterogêneo de regimes de verdades e práticas que configura uma maneira de ser e ter uma infância, (...) influindo significativamente nas perspectivas pedagógicas modernas. Dialogando com Deleuze, Agamben e Veyne, considera-se que todo dispositivo possui: linhas de visibilidade e de enunciação que são, respectivamente, máquinas de “fazer ver” e de “fazer falar” ; linhas de força, que sustentam os campos de visibilidade e os regimes de enunciabilidade; e linhas de subjetivação que são, segundo Deleuze a dimensão do “si próprio” e que configuram o sujeito infantil. Apresenta-se três grupos de práticas articuladas às estas características do dispositivo: as práticas pedagógicas, as práticas divisórias e identitárias de gênero e de sexualidade e as práticas médicas. Observa-se que, para Foucault, o dispositivo da sexualidade disciplina os corpos, regula e normatiza a população, regulamenta o prazer e os saberes sobre o sexo, e, além disso, ocupa-se, por meio desse regime sobre o sexo, da preservação da espécie humana. A infância como dispositivo, na perspectiva ora apresentada neste artigo, também regulamenta a criança, constituindo-a em “sujeito infantil”, estabelecendo uma pedagogia e uma ciência que compuseram o pensamento pedagógico moderno sobre e para infância, ocupando-se também da preservação e da manutenção dessa espécie outra, a criança. Palavras-chave: Infância. Educação. Foucault. Dispositivo. (shrink)

With the six volumes of the Writings edited by the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University since 1982, the monumental work of Charles S. Peirce has finally received the care, respect, and love that it deserves. The sixth volume, object of attention of this review, represents a thorough selection and edition of Peirce's writings from 1886 to 1890.

The radical autonomy of innovation – regardless of who it depends on – must be pursued with no external pressure to make it more suitable for contemporary challenges. The challenge is to look at innovation as a production or vector of phenomena, and therefore no longer be interested in its consequences. Just as non‐standard philosophy can be considered as an invention in philosophy, phenomenology can be perceived as a recommencing of philosophy, a renewal, a rebirth. The authors propose to focus (...) on the method of phenomenology, its detailed constitution both in its theories and in its modalities of implementation, and to compare each aspect systematically, each step of this philosophy, to measure a possible contribution to (re)thinking innovation. Science, psychology and philosophy color Husserl's phenomenology. What will transpire from its introduction is the rigor that emerges, a rigor that translates into a method, tools, almost procedures, for this phenomenology to be established. (shrink)

The authors propose that the third philosophical movement is not an ordinary thought for (re)thinking innovation. Originating from the origins of philosophy more than 2,500 years ago, spiritual exercises are much more often called upon to think about lifestyle than the development of new products or services. All ancient philosophy is a spiritual exercise, an expression that refers to any practice intended to transform, in oneself or in others, the way of living, of seeing things. This notion of spiritual exercise (...) was developed in the different schools of antiquity, mainly among the Stoics, but also among the Epicureans and Cynics. Focusing on the innovator is fundamental, and today's cannot be tomorrow's for the many reasons. No one other than the innovator can imagine, build and develop the world of tomorrow. It is therefore essential that the latter adopt a philosophical way of life based on spiritual exercises. (shrink)

This chapter describes non‐standard philosophy, derived from non‐philosophy, and shows how this discipline and its use can be relevant to the discussion of innovation. The challenge of rebuilding innovation involves developing new processes and new ways of thinking. Multiple challenges, but also opportunities, arise when it comes to (re)thinking innovation with a non‐standard innovation attempt. The first concerns thinking innovation, without which the proposal is neither willing nor able to take root. Non‐standard innovation must be a quasi‐scientific discipline. Because it (...) is not a question of drawing up a new thought that is incapable of proving its interest or reduced to a proposal that does not have practical application. Non‐standard innovation cannot be entrusted solely to the field of organization management. It can only be understood as a form of overcoming, a radicalization or an accomplishment of innovation. (shrink)

Expressions of the form 'S is aware of the fact that p' are commonplace. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than (...) knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as ‘first’ in recent epistemology. (shrink)